It has long been thought that observing distinctive traces of quantum gravity in a laboratory setting is effectively impossible, since gravity is so much weaker than all the other familiar forces in particle physics. But the quantum gravity phenomenology community today seeks to do the (effectively) impossible, using a challenging novel class of `tabletop' Gravitationally Induced Entanglement (GIE) experiments, surveyed here. The hypothesized outcomes of the GIE experiments are claimed by some (but disputed by others) to provide a `witness' of (...) the underlying quantum nature of gravity in the non-relativistic limit, using superpositions of Planck-mass bodies. We inspect what sort of achievement it would possibly be to perform GIE experiments, as proposed, ultimately arguing that the positive claim of witness is equivocal. Despite various sweeping arguments to the contrary in the vicinity of quantum information theory or given low-energy quantum gravity, whether or not one can claim to witness the quantum nature of the gravitational field in these experiments decisively depends on which out of two legitimate modelling paradigms one finds oneself in. However, by situating GIE experiments in a tradition of existing experiments aimed at making gravity interestingly quantum in the laboratory, we argue that, independently of witnessing or paradigms, there are powerful reasons to perform the experiments, and that their successful undertaking would indeed be a major advance in physics. (shrink)

Discover how mathematical sequences abound in our natural world in this definitive exploration of the geography of the cosmos You need not be a philosopher or a botanist, and certainly not a mathematician, to enjoy the bounty of the world around us. But is there some sort of order, a pattern, to the things that we see in the sky, on the ground, at the beach? In A Beginner's Guide to Constructing the Universe, Michael Schneider, an education writer and (...) computer consultant, combines science, philosophy, art, and common sense to reaffirm what the ancients observed: that a consistent language of geometric design underpins every level of the universe, from atoms to galaxies, cucumbers to cathedrals. Schneider also discusses numerical and geometric symbolism through the ages, and concepts such as periodic renewal and resonance. This book is an education in the world and everything we can't see within it. Contains numerous b&w photos and illustrations. (shrink)

Drawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense, Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block's argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block's argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its salience, but not its perceived intensity. We (...) also argue that salience should be equated with mental primer, a close cousin of mental paint that reintroduces difficulties for direct realism and representationism. The upshot is that direct realism and representationism are still in trouble, but not for the reason that Block thinks. (shrink)

According to the Spatial Quantity Association of Response Codes (SQUARC), people hold a mental association between horizontal position and quantity (lower quantities left, higher quantities right). While a large body of research has explored this effect for response speed and judgment accuracy, the affective downstream consequences of the SQUARC remain unexplored. Aiming to address this gap, the present two experiments (pre-registered, total N = 521) investigated whether stimulus arrangements that are compatible with the SQUARC for luminance are affectively preferred to (...) stimulus arrangements that are incompatible. SQUARC-compatible square arrangements (dark-left, bright-right) were preferred over SQUARC-incompatible square arrangements (dark-right, bright-left). The preference for SQUARC compatibility was not moderated by the horizontal orientation of the response scale. Our results confirm the direction of the spatial-luminance association and provide initial support that the cognitive processing of SQUARC compatibility is hedonically marked and appears sufficient to impact affective evaluations. (shrink)

A flurry of technological advances in molecular, cellular and developmental biology during the past decade has provided a clearer understanding of mechanisms underlying phenotypic diversification. Building upon such momentum, a recent paper tackles one of the foremost topics in evolution, that is the origin of species‐specific beak morphology in Darwin's finches.1 Previous work involving both domesticated and wild birds implicated a well‐known signaling pathway (i.e. bone morphogenetic proteins) and one population of progenitor cells in particular (i.e. cranial neural crest), as (...) primary factors for establishing beak size and shape. But these results were limited in their ability to explain fully the morphogenetic bases of patterned outgrowth. So in a quest to identify novel genes whose expression correlated with differences in beak anatomy among Darwin's finches, a DNA microarray approach was undertaken using tissues harvested from the Galápagos Islands. The results are striking and point to a protein called calmodulin, which is a mediator of cellular calcium signaling, as a key determinant of beak length. BioEssays 29: 1–6, 2007. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The migration of publicly-held companies to private status through use of private equity has been both lauded and lambasted. While agency theorists praise the public-to-private or PTP firm as being an efficient form of corporate governance, others suggest that going private allows owners and managers to extract, rather than add, value.We contribute by developing a categorization of the potential sources of value for the PTP firm. We analyze the effects of each source of value, and find that there are specific (...) negative effects for non-equity stakeholders associated with several sources. Our analysis indicates that the degree to which value is added versus extracted will vary across firms; yet, all will tend to engage in some value extraction. Policy implications are discussed. (shrink)

We report on the small-scale (0.5 13 h - 1M, a large-scale bias of ~2.0 and a satellite fraction of 12 ± 2 per cent. Thus, these galaxies occupy haloes with average masses in between those of the higher redshift BOSS CMASS sample and the original SDSS I/II luminous red galaxy sample © 2012 The Authors Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society © doi:10.1093/mnras/sts314.

© 2017. The American Astronomical Society. All rights reserved.We present new observations of the low-mass companion to HD 984 taken with the Gemini Planet Imager as a part of the GPI Exoplanet Survey campaign. Images of HD 984 B were obtained in the J and H bands. Combined with archival epochs from 2012 and 2014, we fit the first orbit to the companion to find an 18 au orbit with a 68% confidence interval between 14 and 28 au, an eccentricity (...) of 0.18 with a 68% confidence interval between 0.05 and 0.47, and an inclination of 119°with a 68% confidence interval between 114°and 125°. To address the considerable spectral covariance in both spectra, we present a method of splitting the spectra into low and high frequencies to analyze the spectral structure at different spatial frequencies with the proper spectral noise correlation. Using the split spectra, we compare them to known spectral types using field brown dwarf and low-mass star spectra and find a best-fit match of a field gravity M6.5 ±1.5 spectral type with a corresponding temperature of K. Photometry of the companion yields a luminosity of log=2.88 ± 0.07 dex with DUSTY models. Mass estimates, again from DUSTY models, find an age-dependent mass of 34 ±1 to 95 ±4 M Jup. These results are consistent with previous measurements of the object. (shrink)

In In re Christopher I., the California Court of Appeal upheld a juvenile court's decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment for a then-1-year-old dependent of the court. Christopher I. had come under juvenile court custody after his biological father, Moises I., physically abused him and rendered him comatose. Christopher's biological mother, Tamara S., was either unwilling or unable to protect him. After the disposition hearing, Tamara petitioned for a “Do Not Resuscitate” order for Christopher and/or removal of his life-sustaining medical (...) treatment. Moises opposed, asserting that the juvenile court did not have authority to make medical decisions for a dependent child, for whom counsel had been assigned, without appointing a guardian. The juvenile court rejected Moises's argument and proceeded with an evidentiary hearing. All six physicians who testified supported the withdrawal of treatment or at least a DNR order. (shrink)

This paper presents the development andvalidation of new measurement tools to exploreself-efficacy toward service and toward civicparticipation. We developed and administereda survey to 851 students in an AACSB-accreditedcollege of business at a comprehensive publicuniversity located in the Midwest. Traditionalscale development methodologies plusconfirmatory factor analysis and simultaneousfactor analysis in several populations wereused to analyze both a primary sample and aholdback sample. Results strongly support thevalidity and reliability of the surveyinstrument. Future use for the instrumentincludes verification of the effectiveness ofpedagogies designed to (...) increase self-efficacytoward service and motivation for civicparticipation in business students. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

The tsunami effect of the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting many aspects of scientific activities. Multidisciplinary experimental studies with international collaborators are hindered by the closing of the national borders, logistic issues due to lockdown, quarantine restrictions, and social distancing requirements. The full impact of this crisis on science is not clear yet, but the above-mentioned issues have most certainly restrained academic research activities. Sharing innovative solutions between researchers is in high demand in this situation. The aim of this paper is (...) to share our successful practice of using web-based communication and remote control software for real-time long-distance control of brain stimulation. This solution may guide and encourage researchers to cope with restrictions and has the potential to help expanding international collaborations by lowering travel time and costs. (shrink)

The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way is an expose of certain theoretical problems in cognitive science, and in particular, problems that concern the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). The problems that Fodor worries plague CTM divide into two kinds, and both purport to show that the success of cognitive science will likely be limited to the modules. The first sort of problem concerns what Fodor has called “global properties”; features that a mental sentence has which depend on how the (...) sentence interacts with a larger plan (i.e., set of sentences), rather than the type identity of the sentence alone. The second problem concerns what many have called, “The Relevance Problem”: the problem of whether and how humans determine what is relevant in a computational manner. However, I argue that the problem that Fodor believes global properties pose for CTM is a non-problem, and that further, while the relevance problem is a serious research issue, it does not justify the grim view that cognitive science, and CTM in particular, will likely fail to explain cognition. (shrink)

This paper resolves some puzzles regarding Spinoza’s appropriations and rejections of various aspects of Bacon’s methodology, and uses these solutions to resolve some long-standing puzzles concerning Spinoza’s modus operandi in the TTP. We argue first that, appearances to contrary, Spinoza takes a consistent line in his assessment of Bacon’s epistemic approach. We argue that Spinoza follows Bacon in grounding his overall epistemic method in a “historiola mentis” (a brief account or history of the mind), and that differences between Spinoza’s and (...) Bacon’s respective historiola mentis can explain Spinoza’s embrace of this inductive method for his interpretation of Scripture in the TTP, as well as his general abandonment of Bacon’s inductive method in the metaphysical investigation of the Ethics. In short, we argue that the “historiola mentis” constructed by Bacon depicts the intellect as an error-prone faculty that needs be continuously restrained by observation and experimentation—a depiction which motivates Bacon’s reformed inductive empiricism. Spinoza accepts this depiction in regard to a subset of the mind’s ideas—the ideas of the imagination, and hence sees the inductive method as suitable for interpreting Scripture. But contra Bacon, Spinoza’s “historiola mentis” also shows that the human mind includes a subset of ideas that yield true, certain knowledge of things “infinite” and sub specie aeternitatis. Spinoza finds these “intellectual” ideas to be quite useful for systematic metaphysics, but of limited use for interpreting historical texts like Scripture. (shrink)

Cassirer’s concept of symbolic forms represents a cultural-philosophical approach in which specific modes of objectification, the symbolic forms themselves, establish an independent truth. This truth does not consist in a purely analytical truth, but in the fact that we live along these symbolic forms in a specific stubbornness. When we use language, we live and experience language in its specific autonomy. The same applies to the other symbolic forms developed by Cassirer. Both before the cultural-philosophical phase of creation and within (...) the philosophy of symbolic forms, Cassirer refers to mathematics several times. An interesting tension arises as to whether Cassirer could have understood mathematics as a symbolic form in its own right. On the one hand, cultural-historical considerations in Cassirer’s work speak in favour of this; on the other hand, Cassirer embeds mathematics as a mere formal science in physics and thus in the philosophical form of science as a whole. The article explores this tension—mathematics as a symbolic form—and shows that only indications within the framework of the historical-hermeneutical treatment would speak in favour of such an interpretation. Furthermore, the article argues that a specific, cultural-historical semiotics can be considered for mathematics in Cassirer’s work. (shrink)

This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory of meaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of the kind developed (...) by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

Nexuses such as exemplification are the fundamental ties that structure reality as a whole. They are “formal” in the sense of constituting the form, not the matter of reality and they are “transcendental” inasmuch as they transcend the categorial distinctions between the denizens of reality, including that between existents and non-existents. I shall advocate a moderately particularist view about (external) nexuses and argue that it provides not only the best solution to Bradley’s regress, but also an elegant account of symmetrical (...) relations (both formal and material), as well as of temporal and modal change. These advantages are illustrated by the reconstruction of an Aristotelian ontology of exemplification involving substances, kinds and material attributes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:A key factor in the decision to convert a publicly owned company to private status is the expectation that value will be created, providing the firm with rent. These rents have implications regarding the property rights of the firm’s capital-contributing constituencies. We identify and analyze the types of rent associated with the newly private firm. Compared to public firms, going private allows owners the potential to partition part of the residual risk to bond holders and employees, rendering them to be (...) co-residual risk bearers with owners. We propose that new promotion-based contracts with bond holders and employees, reflecting their particular investments, be negotiated as the firm migrates from public to private status. These contracts should acknowledge the firm’s intent to maximize shareholder value and its need to take the risks necessary to do so, but support that the firm’s survival not be undermined due to its possibly opportunistic owners. (shrink)

I critically discuss a controversial ‘trans-Planckian censorship’ conjecture, which has recently been introduced to researchers working at the intersection of fundamental physics and cosmology. My focus explicitly avoids any appeals to contingent research within string theory or regarding the more general gravitational ‘swampland’. Rather, I concern myself with the conjecture’s foundations in our current, well-trodden physics of quantized fields, spacetime, and gravity. In doing so, I locate what exactly within trans-Planckian censorship amounts to a departure from current physics—identifying what is, (...) ultimately, so conjectural about the conjecture. (shrink)

The approach to images as cultural documents of collective memory and instruments of social shaping builds a central theoretical component of cultural theories since its establishment as a critical discipline. Prominent thinkers of cultural studies and art history defined images as symbolic representations and as carriers and storages of affective, cultural expression. The anthology covers this broad understanding of images as carriers of archival value, texts, and complex language; it elaborates on the fundamental role of images as a driving force (...) of ideologies and cultural evolution. The book also includes Charles S. Peirce's full manuscript On the Logic of drawing History from Ancient Documents especially from Testimonies, a genuine treatise on applied science as a universal method of incorporating knowledge across disciplines. (shrink)

Interpreting the emotions of others through their facial expressions can provide important social information, yet the way in which we judge an emotion is subject to psychosocial factors. We hypothesized that the age of a face would bias how the emotional expressions are judged, with older faces generally more likely to be viewed as having more positive and less negative expressions than younger faces. Using two-alternative forced-choice perceptual decision tasks, participants sorted young and old faces of which emotional expressions were (...) gradually morphed into one of two categories—“neutral vs. happy” and “neutral vs. angry.” The results indicated that old faces were more frequently perceived as having a happy expression at the lower emotional intensity levels, and less frequently perceived as having an angry expression at the higher emotional intensity levels than younger faces in young adults. Critically, the perceptual decision threshold at which old faces were judged as happy was lower than for young faces, and higher for angry old faces compared to young faces. These findings suggest that the age of the face influences how its emotional expression is interpreted in social interactions. (shrink)

Recent debate by feminist scholars in philosophy of sport has been focused on the status of women’s sport as a protected category. Positions have varied significantly, from no need for a protected category anymore—to allow women’s sport to flourish and to give them a fair opportunity, given that men’s sport still dominates, just as it has in the past.It will be argued that: i) the concept of a ‘protected category’ is tied logically to the concept of fair play and has (...) been defined and enforced through the rules in sport and generally requires some kind of certification for inclusion. These specific rules will be analyzed in detail. Having separate women’s events means that logically it must be possible to exclude, and exclusion is not a popular stance as many have argued that the onus is on inclusion from a human rights perspective. Thus, sport policy makers are truly in an intractable position. On the one hand, no qualifying athlete should have to ‘dope down’ (or ‘dope up’) to compete in the Olympic Games. On the other hand, women athletes have argued that sex equality in competitive sport is a legitimate goal and that separating athletes in competition by biological sex traits is the only way to achieve this goal. It seems criminal to ask athletes to ‘dope down’ to be able to compete in the Olympic Games, however, although a new auxiliary rule creating new sub-classification of women athletes with testosterone higher than the stipulated cut off seems logical on the face of it, these cases are statistically rare. It is concluded that the community of women athletes should have the most significant voice, as historically, the criteria for the women’s sport-protected category have been predominantly determined by men. That is not to say that men’s voices, or voices outside of the women’s sports community of practitioners, cannot be heard, but they should not be the deciding factor. (shrink)

In the following article, it will be argued that there are at least four clusters of arguments generally proposed to justify banning doping in sport and that Simon’s contribution has been of a seminal nature to at least two of the clusters.

This study examines overseas investing by U.S.-domiciled pension plans. The authors explore whether U.S. pension plans invest based on corporate social performance in a core overseas market, the United Kingdom. As a guide to social investing opportunities available to U.S. pension funds in the United Kingdom, their investments are compared to U.K.-domiciled pension plan domestic investments. U.S. labor union plan portfolios have a positive relationship with workplace practices, and U.S. private plan portfolios, with CSP’s community dimension. U.S. state and foundation (...) plan portfolios have no relationship with CSP. Other than union plans, U.S. pension plans stress corporate financial performance in their U.K. investments. U.K. union plan portfolios have a positive relationship with workplace practices, and U.K. state, foundation, and private plan portfolios with environment. (shrink)

It is argued first, that Spinoza's Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is best seen as an auxiliary premise and not as an axiom of the Ethics; second, that Spinoza held the PSR to be a self-evident truth that indicates a necessary condition for clearly and distinctly representing the existence or non-existence of a thing; and third, that this interpretation of Spinoza's PSR explains the near absence of the PSR within the demonstrations of the Ethics as well as the importance of (...) the principle in Spinoza's thought. (shrink)

The themes of will and willing form a central but so far largely overlooked level of discourse in Hartmann’s Gregorius. At the heart of this discourse is the opposition between human and divine will, which is negotiated in terms of the tension between controllability and uncontrollability. To this end, Hartmann’s legendary romance takes recourse to a narrative pattern characteristic of, among others, the Latin legend of St. Brendan. Structuring the text and plot of Gregorius, it serves to present the protagonist’s (...) voyages on the water as a surrender to the will of God. When the protagonist decides to leave the monastery island, however, the pattern is conspicuously deviated from. It is through this deviation that the second instance of incest emerges as a personally attributable result of the protagonist’s attitude toward his creaturely will – which requires correction – rather than as guilt in the moral-theological sense. In Hartmann, a quasi-mystical theology of the will is molded into a narrative. In clear contrast to its French source, his adaptation thus reflects on the limits of human self-determination and controllability from an immanent perspective, the relationship to the world, as well as a transcendental perspective, the relationship to God. The prologue and Gregorius’s tablet suggest that Hartmann’s legend also deals with uncontrollability on a meta-level, as it ponders the problem of how the transcendent can be represented through narrative. (shrink)

The idea that sociology has the status of a strict science—that is, that sociology, like mathematics, has at its disposal a well-founded, deductive system of propositions—is nowadays rejected even more by its pragmatic advocates than by its skeptical practitioners; it is refuted both by the arbitrary manipulation of sociology’s internally constitutive, theoretical interconnections at the hands of practical interests and technocratic utility, and by the resultant increasing relativization of its findings. However, as we shall see, the arbitrariness of the treatment (...) of sociology does not correspond with any arbitrariness in its object. On the contrary, with all empirical relativity a structural constancy persists in the agency constructing, comparing, and evaluating the experience of the everyday world, as well as scientific experience. This was precisely Kant’s discovery, that the conditions making possible our primary experience of objects must be, at the same time, the constitutive structure of the objects themselves, and also the framework for the scientifically systematic treatment of them, because otherwise there could be no knowledge in the sense of the structural identification of object, experience, and reflection. This Kantian principle guarantees, then, that sociology is indeed possible as a strict science; that is, it is completely possible as an integral, deductive aspect of theory, as long as we reconstruct, by means of axioms and postulates, the constitution of the object of theory out of the structure of our direct interpersonal experience. In this vein, Rene König, a pioneer in modern German social science, states. (shrink)

Over the last three decades, studies in microbiology have exposed a world of diverse and dynamic interactions. Through metagenomic sequencing, complex bacterial communities became visible and proved important for many biological phenomena. As a result of discovering the connection between microorganisms and organisms’ survival, the notion of the holobiont has become prominent and has been suggested as a biological individual. The view of the holobiont as an individual, commonly known as the Hologenome Theory, focuses on the interactions and relations between (...) the host and its symbionts in the host’s development and evolution. Today, the holobiont is at the heart of the debate on the nature of the biological individual, a debate which is connected to the same question about the nature of the individual organism. (shrink)

l argue that, contra Chalmers,a skeptical scenario involving deception is a genuine possibility,even if he is correct that simulations are real. I call this new skeptical position “Illusory World Skepticism.” Illusory World Skepticism draws from the simulation argument,together with work in physics,astrobiology, and AI,to argue that we may indeed be in an illusory world—a universe scale simulation orchestrated by a deceptive AI—the technophilosopher’s ultimate evil demon. In Section One I urge that Illusory World Skepticism is a bone fide skeptical possibility. (...) In Section Two, I explore features of quantum computation. Then, in Sections Three and Four, I draw from the discussion of quantum computation and assume that the simulation argument is correct,applying considerations from the fields of astrobiology and AI safety to illustrate that illusory world skepticism constitutes what I call “a serious epistemic threat”, a scenario that cannot be dismissed as requiring that knowledge is certainty or which seems to just depict a remote, fictional situation. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese historians have struggled to reform Chinese historiography and to establish a new identity for the Chinese nation. In this article I analyze the historiography of Chen Yinke and Fu Sinian as a case study for this ongoing process of reform.Although both were bound into the dichotomy of dao and history as established by Benjamin Schwartz, they represent quite different solutions to the question of how the relationship between norm and fact has to (...) be conceptualized. Chen Yinke's historiography is one of the first examples of the emerging pluralization of the relationship between dao and history, since he is aware of the subjective influences that affect a historian's research and seems to recognize that these influences can be positive. Fu Sinian's historiography on the other hand is an example of the reintegration of dao and history. He explicitly refutes the claims of theory and interpretation, but actually reintroduces theoretical explanations without identifying them as such. Thus his methodology can be described as a hidden reintegration of dao and history, of norm and fact.These different methodological views imply two divergent approaches to the nature of Sino-Western cultural relations, and to the role of the historian in modern Chinese society. Chen recognizes the fundamental differences between China and the West and assumes the equality of the unequal, that is, the principle that there are no absolute values that could function as norms for comparing different cultures. Because of the pluralization of the relationship between dao and history, the historian is no longer in a position to guide society ideologically and philosophically. He is freed from the constraints of political engagement and assumes the role of a kind of cultural guardian. By contrast Fu assumes a single world civilization based on a universal methodology for accumulating knowledge. He is unable to establish continuity between the particular Chinese past and its present and therefore cannot establish an identity that is both new and at the same time Chinese. Fu also takes a position different from Chen on the role of the historian. He postulates a complete separation from politics, but in historiographical as well as in political practice, he adopts the role of ideological leader and moral critic of those in power. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Emergent Spacetime, the Megastructure Problem, and the Metaphysics of the SelfSusan Schneider (bio)The aim of this article is to introduce new thoughts on some pressing topics relating to my book, Artificial You, ranging from the fundamental nature of reality to quantum theory and emergence in large language models (LLM) like GPT-4. Since Artificial You was published, the innovations in the domain of AI chatbots like GPT-4 have been (...) rapid-fire, and at times dizzying. The thoughtful discussion in this symposium offers an important opportunity for cross-cultural engagement on these issues and more. I am grateful for the opportunity to learn from the insights of these authors and editors. [End Page 314]The order of my comments will be as follows: in the context of considering Christian Coseru's intriguing response (section 1), I begin by discussing the nature of the self, which I use as a springboard into larger, vexing issues about the nature of fundamental reality, given work on emergent spacetime (ES) (section 2). I offer a "Prototime Interpretation" of quantum mechanics in which spacetime emerges from a prototemporal arena, and use this idea to explore the nature of the self and mind.Using the assumption of ES, I devise an approach to metaphysically fundamental objects (which I call "quantum objects") based on quantum entanglement and the bundle theory of substance. I illustrate how the self or mind, insofar as it is a substance that supervenes on quantum objects, could be partly or fully determined by the properties of the quantum objects on which it supervenes. Intriguingly, this would mean that the self or mind is not located in any singular point in space at a given time. I also explain how the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics is compatible with change and causation at the fundamental level.In section 3 I turn to Inês Hipólito's interesting article, discussing the import of not underestimating AI autonomy in light of the increasingly sophisticated large-language models (LLMs).1 I raise the "AI Megastructure Problem," a new problem of AI control arising in the context of the incipient AGI systems that are now populating the AI ecosystem. The problem, which arose from a collaboration with Kyle Kilian, considers the possibility of emergent properties from the interaction of the LLMs and other AI's in the AI ecosystem (Schneider and Kilian 2023). Then, turning to Noam Cook's intriguing discussion of Japanese philosophy, I consider the pressing issue of testing for machine consciousness, devising a modified version of my AI consciousness test (ACT), originally developed with astrophysicist Edwin Turner. I add an "interpretability component" to the ACT to deal with the case of LLMs (section 4).I. Patternism and the Biological Process ViewChristian Coseru's intriguing piece focuses on the chapters on personal identity in Artificial You, proposing that when it comes to the nature of the self, one should adopt "a biologically informed process-ontology perspective on personal identity," which "means recognizing that organic identity is different in kind: it is an identity of form rather than of matter."His position is akin to the patternist views that I argue against in Artificial You in the sense that it embraces the idea that form, rather than the particular matter that comprises one's brain and body, is key to one's survival over time. But there are important differences as well. For transhumanists tend to believe that the self can survive radical changes in one's substrate, transitioning from thinking with a biological brain to computing with a network of microchips, for instance. Coseru departs from this, writing: [End Page 315]As organisms, persons endure by undergoing constant change on a fundamentally cellular level, including the change in the neural pathways that realize the cognitive processes of thinking and expressing these very thoughts right now.Furthermore:[I]f persons are processes rather than things, then they cannot be cognitively enhanced by augmenting, replacing or transferring their functioning parts (e.g., brain cells).I will call this position the "Biological Process View" (BPV). I have several questions about it. First, how does this position solve one of the key problems I raised for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism RediscoveredUlrich Johannes SchneiderMichael Albrecht, Eklektik. Eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994 (Quaestiones 5), 771p.Patrice Vermeren, Victor Cousin. Le Jeu de la Philosophie et de l’Etat, Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1995 (Collection “La philosophie en commun”), 390p.Not so long ago eclecticism was held to be little more than a non-systematic form of thinking or constructing, and still today that is the generally accepted (...) meaning of the term. Moreover, eclecticism has lost its traditional bad reputation and seems increasingly attractive to late twentieth-century thought in search of non-dogmatic and non-systematic forms of philosophizing. At the same time, however, historians of philosophy are discovering that eclecticism was a distinct and important feature of European intellectual history. In particular eclecticism can be recognized within early modern thinking especially at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, and in France the philosophy of the nineteenth century can be seen as essentially eclectic until the revolution of 1848.Whatever the significance of the postmodern state of mind, recent views concerning philosophical eclecticism are largely the product of researches into the history of philosophy. There is an obvious inclination of today’s intellectual historians to investigate background figures of European modernity. The increasing willingness of historians to enlarge the notion of philosophy in both its disciplinary and historical definition seems to be in agreement with a similar disposition of contemporary philosophers. As we can learn from Michael Albrecht’s and Patrice Vermeren’s books, a critical appreciation of eclecticism throws light both on the conditions of contemporary philosophizing and on the politics of philosophy in the modern age.What Albrecht does in his encyclopedic examination of eclectic ideas is very different in scope and method from Vermeren’s study of Cousin. However, [End Page 173] both authors address philosophy as a university discipline, and both suggest that eclecticism resonates in certain strategic ways with contemporary lines of thinking. Although the eclecticism of early modern Germany and that of nineteenth-century France arose in different contexts, here, too, there are important similarities. Both varieties wanted to distance themselves from the mainstream philosophy of their time—German eclectics fighting the influence of Cartesianism, while France’s foremost eclectic, Cousin, was trying to supersede Hegel and Schelling.The first to point out the importance of eclecticism in early modern European philosophy was Helmut Holzhey, 1 and the most condensed account of the whole “syndrome” was given by Horst Dreitzel. 2 We know now that eclecticism was unjustly removed from the history of philosophy. In its past articulation, mainly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, eclectic thinking combined the claim for freedom of thought with the rejection of dogmatism and sectarianism. Michael Albrecht shows with great diligence and with more than abundant evidence that eclecticism is a genuine part of modern scientific and philosophical thought, and any reader of Albrecht’s long list of eclectic thinkers can have no doubt about the importance of the idea.Over more than six hundred pages Albrecht divides his findings into forty-eight chronological chapters. He tries not to comment on his subject, although eclecticism quickly reveals itself as a tricky thing. Albrecht talks loosely about “the idea of eclecticism,” the “eclectic thought,” the “eclectic claim” because he wants to keep the idea of eclecticism close to the literal sense of the word: in Greek ek-legere means selecting, or choosing. Broadly speaking, philosophical eclecticism turns out to be in general just a claim. It was used by those who did not want to be regarded as dogmatic, sectarian, or systematic thinkers. Albrecht reports that claiming to be eclectic did in practice not amount to very much, and indeed he notes (457) that no philosopher ever wrote an eclectic work.Around 1600 Justus Lipsius and Jacopo Manzoni were among the very first to advocate eclecticism openly, and here already Albrecht draws his general conclusion: “Practically no author embracing eclecticism... has made the idea work” (382). This is especially true for philosophers. In medicine and in physics we know of Daniel Sennert and Johann Christoph Sturm who practiced a method based on... (shrink)